CD/PV.677
31 March 1994

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 31 March 1994 at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Gyorgy Boytha (Hungary)

GE.94-60981 (E)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 677th and last plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament during the first part of our annual session.

I have on the list of speakers for today the representatives of the Czech Republic, Ukraine, Canada, Algeria and the United States of America. I give the floor to the representative of the Czech Republic, Mr. Venera.

Mr. VENERA (Czech Republic): Mr. President, it is a particular pleasure for me to take the floor under the presidency of a representative of a country with which we are so closely connected and a personal friend of mine - Ambassador Boytha. May I also thank your predecessor, Ambassador Hoffmann, and welcome Secretary-General of the Conference Ambassador Vladimir Petrovsky, as well as his deputy Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, who share with us their experience and offer us valuable support?

Events of the past years have been persistently demonstrating to us that the world was overmilitarized and overarmed. The participants to the conflicts in the Balkans, in the former Soviet Union and in other parts of the world had too easy access to weapons, including weapons of high destructive power. This unique multilateral negotiating body was therefore rightly applauded when it finally started to react to the urgent need for arms control and disarmament. The conclusion of negotiations on the chemical weapons Convention was its great achievement, and one has to hope that the stockpiles of chemical weapons are put under tight control and destroyed so that no risk appears that they fall into the hands of those involved in regional and ethnic conflicts.

It is encouraging that the Conference has now embarked on serious negotiation of the CTBT. In view of the approaching NPT review and extension conference it is indeed high time to address this long overdue issue expeditiously. Let us hope that a year from now we will have an outline of the draft treaty sufficiently advanced so that it could contribute to the adoption of the decision to extend the NPT indefinitely.

The first session of the CD this year has indicated a clear preference for a comprehensive test ban with no low-yield or so-called peaceful nuclear explosions authorized. Serious doubts were voiced with regard to the idea of monitoring preparatory activities. My delegation subscribes to both the need for a comprehensive nature of the CTBT and a realistic approach to what can be banned and verified. Pre-test activities may best be covered within the framework of the NPT, through the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards or, perhaps, through a set of confidence-building measures which may be agreed in future.

As was the case in negotiating the chemical weapons Convention, verification provisions will probably take most of our time and energy. We should not hesitate to draw on the experience gained in developing verification provisions of the CWC. However, we should not do it automatically, since besides

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similarities there are also substantial differences between the two subject-matters. While the CWC relies heavily on routine inspections and data reporting, the future CTBT will hardly require any extensive routine inspection activities. In the case of challenge on-site inspections the nature of suspected activities will be completely different, though some procedural aspects of the activities of inspectors in the receiving country may be identical irrespective of whether an inspector visits a chemical industry facility or a site where a clandestine nuclear explosion may have occurred.

Perhaps we should constantly keep in mind that in the case of the CTBT we should aim at a cheaper international treaty than was the case for the CWC. The scope of verified activities should be much narrower and the organization for the implementation of the CTBT should thus be smaller in size and budget. Its secretariat may benefit from drawing on the relevant experience and expertise of IAEA, which may prevent the costs of its activities from growing too high.

At the same time we can hardly conceive of such an organization acting without an executive body. It must have an operational ability to review requests for on-site inspections, to assure smooth conduct of an approved on-site inspection and to address treaty compliance questions raised by parties to the treaty. The organization should also be in a position to act independently and be responsible not only for data collection and data exchange but also for data interpretation. This could assure full access of the States parties to the relevant information. At the same time transparency and openness of the organization's activities should make it possible for any State to apply its own processing to the raw data if it is willing to do so. Such a modus operandi will contribute to prompt carrying out of on-site inspections in situations which seem justifiably suspicious.

No delegation seems to question that seismic monitoring should represent the core of the future verification system. As the negotiating process unrolls, views may differ on what other monitoring techniques may be required and to what extent. It is our view that we should make recourse only to such additional measures which may reasonably increase confidence with the treaty. Some of the techniques mentioned so far may seem intellectually exciting, if not exotic. But we should undertake an in-depth analysis of individual measures in order to determine whether their application may be useful for the detection of a clandestine nuclear explosion and be cost-effective. Moreover, it would be wasteful if we chose not to benefit from what national technical means may contribute to compliance with the CTBT. Commercially available satellite imagery could be used rather than, for instance, permanent Earth monitoring exclusively for CTBT verification. If exchange of data stemming from other than seismic monitoring is agreed, it would facilitate the activities of the organization if all data are collected, processed and distributed through a single data exchange system.

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Entry into force is another issue where we should strike the right balance between the need to assure the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States and the threshold countries and the creation of favourable conditions for the treaty's early entry into force without institutionalizing a sort of veto right of any country. We support those who expressed the view that the required minimum number of ratifications should be lower than in the case of the CWC.

Czech experts have been actively participating in the Group of Scientific Experts since the beginning of its work. We are prepared to participate also in GSETT-3, and we shall provide the seismic station and the national data centre which participated in GSETT-2. We support the carrying out of GSETT-3 as originally planned. It should not, however, fail to contribute directly to the negotiating process aimed at the early establishment of the international seismic monitoring system for the CTBT.

My delegation cannot fail to appreciate the moratorium on nuclear testing observed by the four nuclear-weapon States. The recent decision by President Clinton to prolong the moratorium on testing through September 1995 was an encouraging step in the right direction. We would also like to appreciate the valuable workshop on CTBT verification organized by Japan in mid-March.

Non-nuclear-weapon States are justifiably seeking security assurances from the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The CD has been discussing this question for years without, to put it mildly, too much imagination. As a non-nuclear-weapon State the Czech Republic would welcome if some progress on this issue could be achieved before the NPT review and extension conference. It is noteworthy that the present political realities in the former Soviet Union posed the problem of security guarantees very seriously. Besides assistance in the destruction process security guarantees are required so that States with nuclear weapons on their territory, belonging to no other State, could soon join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States. We hope this process is soon going to be accomplished and we also welcome the recent trilateral statement by the Presidents of Russia, Ukraine and the United States. The former Soviet republics certainly represent a particular case. However, good political will and readiness to compromise may, hopefully, inspire also discussions on negative security assurances within the CD.

In the past days the Czech Republic completed its data to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Even if more countries could have participated in submitting data to the Register last year we still find it encouraging that a relatively large number of countries chose to participate in this first exchange and we are looking forward to increased participation this year.

The world has undergone tremendous political changes in the course of the last years. The Warsaw Treaty Organization has been abolished and existing international organizations are changing or, like CSCE, accelerating their institutional development and broadening their scope of activity. The

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United Nations membership is approaching 200 and the Organization is involved in an unprecedented number of operations in support of international peace and security. The Conference on Disarmament, however, still seems to prefer to keep its composition based on ideological cliches of the past. A number of new countries have emerged in East and Central Europe. The worst thing the CD can do is to deny them full participation in what we usually describe as a unique multilateral disarmament negotiating body. There are a number of other countries with excellent expertise in disarmament negotiations which have been applying for CD membership for years.

Treaties with limited participation in the security field belong to the past. The chemical weapons Convention, the future CTBT, not to speak of the NPT, can play their role fully only if their membership is evolving towards universality. States will be more prepared to join international treaties which they had a chance to negotiate directly. The CD, in view of its responsibility in disarmament and security, should not permanently ignore this fact. We are looking forward to a solution which would allow all those interested and prepared to contribute, to join the Conference already this year. Continued efforts to pick up a few among those who have applied for membership so far may complicate unnecessarily the decision on the first extension of the CD in 16 years. Let me, in conclusion, wish good luck to Ambassador Lampreia of Brazil in his efforts to resolve this problem.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of the Czech Republic for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to my country and myself. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Ukraine, Ambassador Slipchenko.

Mr. SLIPCHENKO (Ukraine): Mr. President, as it is for the first time that my delegation takes the floor during your Presidency, I would like to congratulate you on the assumption of these important functions. We are sure that under your guidance the Conference will succeed in furthering achievements already attained while this body was presided by Ambassadors Errera of France and Hoffmann of Germany.

I should confess that this year the delegation of Ukraine has started its work at the Conference on Disarmament with a considerable amount of optimism, being motivated by the desire to add to the positive momentum in its activities created by the decisions taken at the end of the 1993 session of the Conference and the relevant resolutions of the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly. These hopes have been justified to a considerable extent.

First and foremost, we note with satisfaction that participants in the negotiations on a nuclear test ban have made very significant steps towards their ultimate goal of elaborating a comprehensive, truly universal and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty. Useful discussions on this issue - the key to the Conference on Disarmament's current work - have been taking place at plenary

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meetings, and especially at the sessions of the timely established and efficiently steered working organs of the Conference: the NTB Ad Hoc Committee and both of its working groups. In our view, they have created a milieu favourable for reaching agreement on a number of principal structural elements of the future NTBT without undue delay. We are of the opinion that steady progress in the NTB negotiations would be contributing to the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and - equally - to successful preparations for the NPT Review Conference.

Apart from the ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, it is the issue of security guarantees to the non-nuclear States that bears special significance in this respect. The interrelation existing between these problems is extremely actual for Ukraine as a country in the process of ridding itself of its nuclear "heritage".

Thus, we consider the trilateral statement of the Presidents of Ukraine, the United States of America and Russia, as well as the Joint Statement on Development of United States-Ukrainian Friendship and Partnership of 4 March 1994 - jointly distributed by the parties concerned as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament - to be positive steps not only contributing to reaching a common understanding on matters pertaining to nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine, but also providing an important input into the process of deliberations on security assurances within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament and in more general context.

Ukraine advocates the idea of a comprehensive approach to this problem. It can be implemented only provided our requirements concerning security assurances to non-nuclear States are met in full measure, taking into consideration the specific character of our country's current situation.

We would certainly welcome a joint declaration or any other legally binding document, worked out by the nuclear States. At the same time we feel that such a document could be followed - eventually - by a broader international instrument in the form of an agreement or convention: the necessity of its conclusion has been already voiced by a number of delegations to the Conference on Disarmament. We think that the creation of such an instrument would substantially enhance the NPT's acquiring the status of a truly universal instrument.

Taking the floor at the last plenary meeting of this part of the current session of the Conference on Disarmament, our delegation cannot but refer again to the issue of the Conference's membership expansion. I do it with a certain regret because, in our assessment, now the Conference stands further from its resolution compared to the initial period of its work in 1994. The corresponding resolution of the United Nations General Assembly has seemingly laid a solid foundation for finding an early positive solution to this problem by setting the date and even allocating additional funds to the Conference on the presumption of its increased membership. The Conference has witnessed a number of significant

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developments since 25 January; the only area where there is no progress in sight is the issue of its expansion.

Being fully aware of the high sensitivity and complexity of this problem, we deem it necessary to join a number of those in this hall who have on previous occasions warned the Conference that further tardiness could jeopardize the impressive progress achieved by its members on other items of its agenda. It is especially evident in the NTB Ad Hoc Committee, where negotiations have entered the phase when active involvement of the delegations of non-member States is of critical importance. It is equally clear that our delegation, as many others, cannot participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee and its working groups to the full extent and on a regular basis without adequate experts' backing and other resources which can be provided only on the basis of our Government's decision directly dependent upon the regularization of Ukraine's status within the Conference.

I would like to conclude my statement today by expressing our hope that the appointment of Ambassador Lampreia of Brazil as a Friend of the Chair would facilitate finding a long-awaited solution to the problem of expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament already at the beginning of the second part of its 1994 session.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Ukraine for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to Ambassador Shannon of Canada, who will speak in his capacity as Special Coordinator on "cut-off", and will present, in accordance with the Presidential statement on the agenda and organization of work of the 1994 session of the Conference, a progress report on the consultations he has held so far on the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Mr. SHANNON (Canada): Allow me, Sir, to also express my congratulations to you on your assumption of the presidency and to indicate to you that I and my delegation will give you our full cooperation and will assist you in carrying out your responsibilities.

As required by my mandate as Special Coordinator of the initiative to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, I am pleased today to report on the progress of my consultations to date. You will recall that I was asked to seek views on the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of such material for weapons purposes.

I have consulted a substantial number of delegations on a bilateral basis as well as all groups, including observers. I am grateful to those delegations who

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have expressed views. I intend to continue consultations during the inter-sessional period following the conclusion of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and in the next part of the Conference.

I am reporting today on matters on which there appears to be a growing convergence of views as well as on those areas where further consultations clearly will be necessary. I will also suggest next steps which the Conference may wish to take.

My consultations indicate that a preponderant majority view exists among delegations that the Conference on Disarmament is the most appropriate international forum to negotiate such a treaty. I hope that this soon will be a unanimous view but that is not now the case. Accordingly the balance of my report should be read with that caveat in mind.

There are a substantial number of States which believe that the process of negotiation of a cut-off treaty could be at least launched while we negotiate a comprehensive teat-ban treaty. This could be achieved through the establishment, at the appropriate time, of an ad hoc committee of the CD in accordance with its usual procedures. Following the lines of the Presidential statement of 25 January, this work might fit most appropriately under agenda item 2. Obviously, it would be part of the function of such an ad hoc committee, as its first priority, to decide on its programme of work and to do so in a manner that would take into account the overall workload of the CD in other ad hoc committees.

My consultations showed that there is a clear need for the Conference to increase its technical knowledge base in order properly to address the issues involved in a subject as complex as cut-off. An ad hoc committee, if it is established, would need to consider at an early stage how to approach this matter. The United Nations General Assembly resolution (48/75 L) which addressed this issue last December specifically contemplated drawing on the assistance of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the examination of verification arrangements, as and when required; and rule 41 of the Conference similarly makes specific mention of the role of IAEA in the work of the CD. Consequently, it will be advisable early on to decide how the CD wishes to use the expertise of IAEA.

In this regard, a variety of alternatives are available. An ad hoc committee could decide to simply ask IAEA to construct a verification package as some delegations have suggested. Alternatively, such a committee could decide to establish an experts group on verification based in Geneva, meeting as a working group of the committee. In that form, it could receive submissions of national experts, and experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency, and other international organizations as and when required. The committee could then decide to frame three or four verification scenarios to which it could request the working group to respond.

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A further alternative would see at an early stage an ad hoc committee deciding to create a separate group of national and international experts, reporting to the CD ad hoc committee but maintaining close links with IAEA and meeting either in Geneva or in Vienna. Some elements of the GSE model might be useful in constituting such a group. Again, the committee could frame questions for response by such a group within a time-frame to be decided by the committee.

In either of the latter two cases, most delegations would likely agree that IAEA should be invited to contribute views and participate in a manner to be determined by the ad hoc committee. Obviously, any role of IAEA during negotiations would be quite distinct from any possible function it may have in any permanent verification regime established under a treaty, once concluded.

As to the way ahead, I plan during the latter part of the inter-sessional period (after UNDC) and in the next part to continue my consultations with interested delegations and groups, with a view to determining an appropriate mandate for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on cut-off.

Some delegations also have suggested that a broad discussion of issues raised by and related to the cut-off initiative should precede or be an initial part of the commencement of negotiations. In response to those suggestions, I would be prepared to conduct open-ended plurilateral discussions at the same time as continuing bilateral and group consultations. Prior to beginning negotiations, in consultation with the Conference, it may also prove worthwhile to arrange for expert presentations to be made to interested delegations by national experts or international organizations knowledgeable of cut-off issues.

In considering these approaches, we will need to bear in mind that the point of reference is the United Nations General Assembly resolution, adopted by consensus, which recommends the negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

These are some of the avenues I intend to pursue and I intend to keep the Conference informed as progress is made. My hope is, with the full support of delegations, to present a mandate for consideration in the course of the next part.

As I had mentioned I would do upon embarking on these consultations, I sought and received comments from delegations on a number of substantive issues, such as the scope of any agreement, the verification regime and the structure of an eventual cut-off convention. It is not my intention today to enter into any details on these aspects of my consultations - it would obviously be premature. However, I intend to address some of these issues in the context of proposing a mandate for negotiations of a cut-off convention in the CD.

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

I express again my appreciation for the excellent cooperation of all delegations and look forward to continuing my mandate with the full support of all members of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I wish to thank Ambassador Shannon for his very important statement. We all appreciate his untiring efforts in negotiating this issue and we also appreciate the alternatives he has already drawn up concerning the possible approaches to appropriate arrangements. I wish to thank him also for the kind words he addressed to me.

I now give the floor to the representative of Algeria, Ambassador Meghlaoui, who will speak in his capacity as coordinator of the G-21 on negative security assurances.

Mr. MEGHLAOUI (Algeria): I have asked for the floor in order to read a declaration on behalf of the G-21. As you know, my delegation has the honour to coordinate the activities of this Group on the matters relating to negative security assurances. This is the text of the declaration on the question of negative security assurances.

"The Group of 21 reiterates its conviction that the only completely effective security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons lie in a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament, and a complete elimination of these weapons.

"The present international situation has eroded the traditional arguments for the maintenance of nuclear arsenals and clearly calls for the nuclear-weapon States to engage on an effective process of nuclear disarmament. There is also a need to recognize the right of non-nuclear-weapon States not to be attacked or threatened with these weapons.

"This position, shared by the overwhelming majority of non-nuclear-weapon States, is a long-standing one. It dominated the debates for a long time, during the negotiation of the non-proliferation Treaty, during its successive review conferences, during all the previous sessions of the Conference on Disarmament, and during hundreds of multilateral meetings, conferences and symposia devoted to disarmament or security.

"In particular, the 14 years during which functioned the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons have always seen the reconfirmation of this position by the Group of 21.

"Today, the existence of such a right to guarantees is also recognized by nuclear-weapon States. However, not all nuclear-weapon States accept the

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idea of implementing those guarantees in a multilaterally negotiated, legally binding, international instrument based on a common formula.

"That explains why, though there is apparently no objection to the principle within the members of the Conference on Disarmament, its Ad Hoc Committee leads only into minor progress and is still far away from proposing a text of consensus.

"Non-nuclear-weapon States that have engaged themselves not to acquire nuclear weapons should be covered by equal and unconditional guarantees, in a multilateral convention which might be based on following principles:

"(a) the nuclear-weapon States will engage to never use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States;

"(b) Non-nuclear-weapon States should have right to guarantees, contents of which will be negotiated within the Ad Hoc Committee;

"(c) the convention should result from a negotiation between all members of the Conference on Disarmament and should be legally binding;

"(d) the common formula enclosed in the convention should be clear, credible, without any ambiguity, and should respond to the concerns of all the parties, including those related to nuclear proliferation in all its aspects;

"(e) the convention should include clear undertakings of nuclear-weapon States concerning a general and complete nuclear disarmament.

"The Group of 21 considers that the conclusion of such a convention should be an important step towards achieving an effective regime of non-proliferation in all its aspects as well as nuclear disarmament.

"It also takes the view that nuclear-weapon States should continue and carry forward the process of de-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons.

"Negative security assurances are a vital element and an important measure of this process.

"The Group of 21 believes that an international legal instrument on negative security assurances and a CTBT, together with other nuclear arms limitation measures, are essential elements of an effective international regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects.

"Accordingly, delegations of G-21 States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty feel that substantive progress in the

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aforementioned areas, and the advancement of these objectives, will decisively influence the outcome of the 1995 review conference of the NPT.

"These member States also believe that, as a first step, nuclear-weapon States should extend, in a legally binding form, the security assurances granted in some international instruments, that assure some non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty.

"On the eve of the forthcoming review conference, which will decide on questions of vital importance for the future of the international legal regime of non-proliferation, the Group of 21 calls upon all members of the Conference on Disarmament to give a concrete expression of their political will, by taking measures outlined above, in response to the needs of the time."

Mr. President, we should be very grateful if you would take the appropriate steps to register this declaration as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and to have it distributed to all delegations participating in the work of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Algeria for the statement he made on behalf of the G-21. We have taken note of it and of course it will be distributed as a document of the Conference. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Mr. President, allow me to express my congratulations upon your assumption of the presidency, and to pledge my full cooperation and that of my delegation as you carry out your functions. We look forward to working with you and your staff over the next several weeks.

In his address to the United Nations General Assembly last 27 September, President Clinton announced a programme to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As part of that effort, the President said that the United States would press for an international agreement that would ban the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. The United Nations General Assembly subsequently adopted by consensus a resolution on the prohibition of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. That resolution, among other things, expressed the conviction of the international community that a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning production of fissile material for such purposes would make a significant contribution to nuclear non-proliferation, and it called upon all States to demonstrate commitment to the objectives of such a treaty. In January, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, John Holum, spoke at the

inaugural plenary session for 1994 of the Conference on Disarmament. In his statement, Mr. Holum reiterated the United States commitment to negotiate a global fissile material production cut-off agreement, and emphasized that such an agreement should be negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament. As the first part of the 1994 session comes to a close, I would like to echo Director Holum's statement on the Conference on Disarmament as the negotiating forum for the cut-off convention. We support the establishment of an appropriately mandated ad hoc committee to begin the negotiations here in the CD.

Consequently, the United States delegation very much supported the idea of a Special Coordinator to consult on the ways and means to negotiate a cut-off convention. We particularly welcomed Ambassador Shannon's appointment to that position. My delegation has listened with interest to Ambassador Shannon's report and commends him on his careful and systematic approach to his consultations, the thoughtful report he has just given the Conference, and the recommendations he has made for the way ahead.

Regarding the question of interaction between the CD and the expertise of the International Atomic Energy Agency, raised in Ambassador Shannon's report, the United States believes that the general framework for a verification article in the treaty should be negotiated in the CD. At the same time, we feel that the CD should request the IAEA Director General to establish a group of national experts to prepare a report to the CD, containing options on and recommendations for the verification aspects of the treaty.

The United States looks forward to continuing discussions in the CD on the way ahead for an international convention. My delegation is committed to advancing the non-proliferation programme introduced by President Clinton last fall. A cut-off convention that would end the production of fissile material for nuclear-weapons purposes is a very significant part of that programme.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of the United States of America for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage?

This not being the case, may I now turn to the informal paper circulated by the secretariat, containing the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the first week of the second part of the annual session, that is from 16 to 20 May 1994? This timetable has been prepared in consultation with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees. As usual, it is merely indicative and may be changed if necessary. On that understanding, I suggest that we adopt it.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: That concludes our business for today. Does any delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? If not, I intend to adjourn this plenary

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meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 19 May 1994 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11 a.m.